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Abstract
Experimental evidence and ﬁeld data suggest that agents hold two seemingly un-
related biases: failure to account for the fact that the behavior of others reﬂects their
private information (winner's curse), and a tendency to value a good more once it is
owned (endowment eﬀect). In this paper we propose that these two phenomena are
closely related: the biases fully compensate for each other in various economic interac-
tions, and induce an as-if rational behavior. We pay speciﬁc attention to barter trade,
of the kind that was common in prehistoric societies, and suggest that the endowment
eﬀect and the winner's curse could have jointly survived natural selection together.
Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Endowment Eﬀect, Winner's Curse, Cursed Equi-
librium, Evolution.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D82.
1 Introduction
The growing ﬁeld of Behavioral Economics has continuously identiﬁed and deﬁned diﬀer-
ences between the canonical model of rational decision making and actual human behavior.
These diﬀerences, usually referred to as anomalies or biases, have been identiﬁed through
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controlled experiments in the laboratory, as well as in ﬁeld experiments.1 Though some re-
searchers have challenged the existence of some biases, it seems there is a signiﬁcant body of
evidence for systematic biases that depart from payoﬀ-maximizing behavior. Such behavior
is puzzling to economists, who are trained to think that competitive forces in our society and
economy select optimal over suboptimal behavior.
Two of these biases are the endowment eﬀect and the winner's curse. The endowment
eﬀect refers to the phenomenon where individuals place a higher value on a good once they
own it. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), in a well-known experiment, distributed
coﬀee mugs to half of the students in a classroom. When asked to assess the value of the
mug, the mug-owners had on average a much higher valuation than the rest of the students.
An example of the economic implication of the endowment eﬀect is the violation of the
Coase theorem: the allocation of resources would depend on the assignment of property
rights even when costless trade is possible. The winner's curse is the failure of an agent to
account for the informational content of other players' actions. The bias was ﬁrst identiﬁed
in common-value auctions, where an auctioned item has an objective value, but each player
receives noisy (and private) information regarding that value. In a symmetric equilibrium of
such an auction, the winner of the auction is the player who has the highest estimate and
therefore places the highest bid. This player's estimate is likely to overestimate the value of
the object. Fully rational players are supposed to take this into account, and decrease their
bidding accordingly. However, a large collection of experimental literature (Bazerman and
Samuelson, 1983; Kagel and Levin, 1986; Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987; Lind and Plott,
1991) shows that people do not take this into account and overbid instead. Thus, the winner
of the auction is most likely to get an object that is worth less than he expected, and may
even receive a negative payoﬀ. Hence, the winner's curse. 2
We demonstrate that these two seemingly unrelated biases actually compensate for each
other in several economic interactions: errors made due to the winner's curse can be fully
corrected if the agent demonstrates the endowment eﬀect, and vice versa, resulting in an
as-if rational behavior, i.e., a behavior identical to that of an agent without any of these
biases. Speciﬁcally, we study the relation between these two biases in the context of bilateral
trade. Bilateral trade is an important and meaningful economic interaction and is one of the
earliest economic activities that took place in prehistoric societies (Herskovits, 1952; Polanyi,
1For a survey of laboratory experiments in economics, see Kagel and Roth (1997). For a recent overview
of ﬁeld experiments in economics, see Harrison and List (2004). For speciﬁc examples see the survey below.
2This failure is also manifested in other circumstances, where there are no winners (or losers), and the
term winner's curse is usually used also in these contexts as well (for a more elaborate discussion and
references on the endowment eﬀect and the winner's curse see the survey below).
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1957). We suggest that these two biases were not driven to extinction by natural selection
because they evolved together as a second-best adaptation that resulted in an as-if rational
behavior in bilateral trade. This also suggests an explanation of how behavioral biases might
have evolved as shortcuts to rational decision making.3
Evidence from anthropology suggests that trade between groups, based on localization
of natural resources and tribal specializations, was common in primitive societies (see Her-
skovits, 1952; Polanyi, 1957; Sahlins, 1972; Haviland, Prins, Walrath, and McBride, 2007).
Moreover, [t]he literature on trade in nonliterate societies makes clear that barter is by far
the most prevalent mode of exchange (Herskovits, 1952, p. 188). We therefore model trade
as a game in which each of two traders owns a diﬀerent kind of indivisible good. The value of
each good depends on an unobservable property, which is known to the owner of the good but
not to his trading partner. The players' potential gains from trade also depend on additional
conditions that result from initial stock, locations, weather, etc. While these conditions are
known to both players before the start of trade, we assume that they can change from one
instance of trade to another. In this simple version of barter, traders simply decide whether
or not to participate, and goods are exchanged if both traders agree.
A trader is cursed (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) if he believes that his partner's agreement
to trade is independent of the quality of that partner's good. We ﬁrst show that a cursed
trader has a unique dominant strategy, by which he is willing to trade his own good even
when its quality is relatively high. This is because traders do not take into account the fact
that, conditional on the other trader's agreement to trade, the average quality of the good
they get is lower than the unconditional average. Therefore, cursed agents' expected gain is
always lower than the actual average gain (this is the winner's curse), and there are types
who agree to trade their high-quality goods despite an actual negative expected gain from
trade. When we solve for a Nash equilibrium, thus assuming that traders form rational beliefs
during trade, the result is trade that occurs only for low-quality goods (similar to the case
of a lemon market).
We then proceed to the evolutionary results. We start by presenting a two-stage game.
The second stage of this game is identical to the trading game between cursed agents as
described above, except that each trader is not only cursed, but is also endowed with a
perception bias that distorts his signal. In the ﬁrst stage, denoted the perception game,
3Samuelson (2005, p. 100) states that a ﬁrst step for achieving a better understanding of the endowment
eﬀect and its economic implications might be the construction of theoretical models, especially models
shedding insight into how and when it might have been evolutionary valuable to condition valuation on
ownership. We believe that our model contributes to such an understanding.
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two fully rational principals are each associated with a trader and beneﬁt from their trader's
second-stage payoﬀ. The principals simultaneously choose a perception bias for their traders,
taking into account the outcome of the trading game that follows. Then, given their distorted
private signals, the cursed traders play their unique dominant strategy. We characterize the
Nash equilibrium of the perception game, and show that this equilibrium is unique, pure,
symmetric, dominance solvable, and that it exhibits the endowment eﬀect. That is, principals
choose a perception bias that leads traders to systematically overestimate the value of their
own good. Moreover, we show that in equilibrium, this endowment eﬀect fully corrects for
the winner's curse, and traders play the trading game as if they were fully rational traders
playing the Nash equilibrium.
The perception game can be interpreted as the product of natural selection, and indeed
we show that the endowment eﬀect can evolve in a population of cursed individuals. We
assume a population of cursed traders, each having a type that determines some perception
bias for its members. If traders are randomly matched at each generation, and payoﬀ from
trade serves as ﬁtness, then regardless of the initial distribution of biases, the only result
of the replicator dynamics is an entire population that exhibits the same endowment eﬀect
found in the perception game.
We further extend this evolutionary insight by presenting a model in which both biases
evolve together. We ﬁrst present partially cursed traders, who underestimate how the be-
havior of others reﬂects their private information but do not ignore it completely, and deﬁne
the appropriate partially cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) in the trade game.4
We then show that for any level of cursedness there is a speciﬁc endowment eﬀect that fully
compensates for it and leads to an as-if rational behavior. A stronger endowment eﬀect is
required to compensate for higher levels of cursedness. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium
of the two-stage game and show that principals always choose pairs of biases (cursedness
level and endowment eﬀect) that imply as-if rational behavior of their agents. The intuition
behind this is the following: principals can always choose rational strategies for their agents;
thus they will never choose a strategy that leads to suboptimal behavior. This leads to the
following evolutionary result: in the long run, the population of the surviving types is likely
to be heterogeneous such that (1) diﬀerent surviving types have diﬀerent levels of each bias,
(2) there is a perfect correlation between the degrees of the two biases, and (3) all agents
exhibit as-if rational behavior in the trading game. This result implies the main falsiﬁable
4We apply Eyster and Rabin's notion of Cursed Equilibrium because of its ﬂexibility and tractability. Us-
ing, for example, Jehiel's Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium will lead to results which are qualitatively
similar (see Jehiel and Koessler, 2008.)
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prediction of our model: there is a substantial positive correlation between the winner's curse
and the endowment eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the literature on the endow-
ment eﬀect and the winner's curse, and discusses closely related papers from the evolutionary
literature. Section 3 presents the trading game, the two-stage game, and the full evolutionary
arguments for the simple case in which agents are fully cursed. Section 4 discusses the case
in which traders are partially cursed and both biases evolve together. Lastly, a discussion
on the predictions of our model and the robustness of the results appears in Section 5. All
proofs that are not in the main text appear in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Experimental Literature on the Two Biases
In what follows we brieﬂy describe the main experimental ﬁndings on the two biases discussed
in this paper. The interested reader is referred to Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991)
for a survey on the endowment eﬀect and to Kagel and Levin (2002, chapter 1) for a survey
on the winner's curse.
2.1.1 The Endowment Eﬀect
The endowment eﬀect (Thaler, 1980) refers to the phenomenon where individuals value a
good much more once they own it. As a result, prices exist where such individuals are not
willing to buy the good or sell it if they own it. That is, the price is perceived as too high for
buying but too low for selling. Thus people do not trade even when they would beneﬁt from
it. The endowment eﬀect was observed in various experimental setups, from a simple trade of
mugs and chocolate bars (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990) to auctions (Knetsch, Tang,
and Thaler, 2001). There is also ﬁeld evidence for its existence, for example in the US housing
market (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Bokhari and Geltner, 2011). Horowitz and McConnell
(2002) survey and analyze the ﬁndings of over forty experimental and empirical studies of
this eﬀect. The main ﬁnding of their analysis is that the endowment eﬀect is strongest for
non-market goods, second strongest for private goods, and weakest in experimental settings
involving money.5
5There are several studies that argue against the existence of the endowment eﬀect. Evidence from ﬁeld
experiments by List (2003, 2004) support the claim that experienced traders do not manifest the endowment
eﬀect. Other authors provide counterevidence (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler, 2001; Bokhari and Geltner,
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2.1.2 Winner's Curse
The winner's curse is the failure of an agent to account for the informational content of other
players' actions. As discussed above, the bias was ﬁrst identiﬁed in common-value auctions,
but it has been observed in a wide range of economic interactions. An example of such a
setup is bilateral trade where the seller and/or the buyer have private information about the
unknown value of the traded good. In such a case, one or both of the traders should take
into account the expected value of the object conditional on the event that the opposite side
agrees to trade, and change the bid/ask accordingly. Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) were
the ﬁrst to identify the winner's curse in experiments that resemble bilateral trade. In an
experimental design à la Akerlof's market for lemons, participants took the role of buyers
in a trade. They were asked to oﬀer a price for an item of unknown value, knowing the
possible distribution of values, and were informed that the seller would only accept the price
if the price were below the seller's value. A sophisticated participant in that experiment
was supposed to understand that the value of the price conditional on the acceptance of
the seller was below the average value, and, given the parameters of the experiment, was
supposed to set a price of zero. However, only a few participants did choose a zero price,
and the majority of them selected prices that were close to the average value, suggesting that
they were cursed. Ball, Bazerman, and Carroll (1991) and Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, and
Bazerman (2007) have shown these results to be robust even in repeated trials with feedback.
The winner's curse was also identiﬁed in several real-life situations. The bias was originally
identiﬁed and termed in a paper on auctions on oil rights in the Gulf of Mexico (Capen,
Clapp, and Campbell, 1971). Additional examples are US timber-lease sales (Mead, 1967;
Hansen, 1985, 1986), corporate takeovers (Roll, 1986), real-estate auctions (Ashenfelter and
Genesove, 1992), and markets for free players in professional sports (Cassing and Douglas,
1980; Blecherman and Camerer, 1998; Massey and Thaler, 2010). While some of these ﬁeld
examples were questioned,6 there is a signiﬁcant amount of evidence that people are cursed
in the sense described above.
2011). A series of papers by Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007, 2011) argue that the endowment eﬀect is not a
real phenomenon but merely a by-product of the experimental setup, but see the response by Isoni, Loomes,
and Sugden (2011).
6For a debate on whether the results from oil rights auctions represent the winner's curse, see Mead,
Moseidjord, and Sorensen (1983) and Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987); for negative evidence in the
context of corporate takeovers, see Boone and Mulherin (2008). Some alternative explanations of situations
that seemingly display the winner's curse are risk aversion and uncertainty regarding the number of auction
participants. For an extensive discussion and references see Kagel and Levin (2002), chapter 1, section 6.
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2.2 Evolutionary Literature on Biases
Our paper is related to a broad literature dealing with the evolution of preferences deviat-
ing from payoﬀ (or ﬁtness) maximization. This indirect evolutionary approach follows the
seminal work of Güth and Yaari (1992) (see also Güth and Kliemt, 1998; Dekel, Ely, and
Yilankaya, 2007). Under this approach, types, or genes, are represented as preferences that
deviate from the maximization of physical ﬁtness. Such a deviation is beneﬁcial (to a certain
extent) to the carrier of the gene due to the resulting eﬀect on other player's strategy. There-
fore nonrational preferences may survive natural selection in the long run.7 The analysis of
the preferences that will prevail in the population can be done with the help of a two-stage
delegation game:8 at the ﬁrst stage each principal (representing a genetic type) chooses the
preference of an agent that will play on its behalf during the second stage. Recently, Win-
ter, Garcia-Jurado, and Mendez-Naya (2009) presented a related two-stage game where the
choice of preferences in the ﬁrst stage is interpreted as a choice of emotions.
Our paper is also related to the literature that explains how behavioral biases may evolve.
Samuelson (2004) studies how natural selection may build relative consumption eﬀects into
preferences (see also Nöldeke and Samuelson, 2005). Robson and Samuelson (2007, 2009)
and Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) show how present bias (dynamic inconsistency) might
have evolved. Heller (2011) demonstrates how overconﬁdence emerges as a tool for risk
diversiﬁcation.
We present a variant of the indirect evolutionary approach literature, with the novel
feature that natural selection does not select the preferences of the agents, but rather selects
their behavioral biases : how much attention they pay to the informational content of other
players' actions, and how they react to their own private information.
Very few papers deal with the possibility that evolution will create two biases that are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent and yet complementary. Waldman (1994), in an early contribution,
shows that an evolutionary dynamics with sexual inheritance is generally expected to yield
only second-best adaptations, which depend on the initial conditions, and do not necessarily
attain the optimal solution to the evolutionary problem. In particular, this implies that agents
may be endowed with two biases, which only approximately compensate for each other.
Waldman (1994) speciﬁcally considers the overestimation signal of self-ability and excess
disutility from eﬀort. Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a) develop a general framework
7Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007b) show that under rather general terms, evolutionary dynamics
always leads to distortions from payoﬀ maximization.
8Delegation games are also applied in various nonevolutionary setups; see, for example, Fershtman, Judd,
and Kalai (1991).
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in which natural selection may lead to perception biases. They give an example where
overconﬁdence is a result of an (indirect) evolutionary process. This result depends on
agents' inability to learn the properties of the environment. They therefore hypothesize
as a possible explanation an additional non-Bayesian learning bias to support the results.9
In a nonevolutionary context, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) study the relation between risk
aversion and the tendency of individuals to consider decision problems one at the time, in a
way that isolates the current problem from pending ones and ignores future opportunities.
Turning to introspection, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) then claim that using a broader
view of several choice problems as a grand problem will cancel out risk aversion, but they
stress that there is no reason to believe that the errors will fully compensate for each other.
Recently, Ely (2011) demonstrated that in evolutionary processes improvements tend to come
in the form of kludges  marginal adaptations that compensate for, but do not eliminate,
fundamental design ineﬃciencies.
Finally, Huck, Kirchsteiger, and Oechssler (2005) and Heifetz and Segev (2004) show
that endowment eﬀect may evolve in populations that engage in bargaining. In both papers
the endowment eﬀect serves as a commitment that prevents an agent from giving up his
own object for a small compensation, and thus improves his stand in the bargaining. These
results, unlike our model, rely on the assumption that a trader observes (at least partially)
the degree of his partner's endowment eﬀect. This explanation complements the mechanism
we present in our paper. We further discuss their results in Section 5.2.
3 Basic Model: Fully Cursed Traders
In this section we formulate and analyze our basic model. We assume that all agents are fully
cursed and that the evolutionary process inﬂuences only their level of endowment eﬀect. In
Section 4 we will relax both assumptions: agents will be partially cursed and the evolution
process will inﬂuence both the level of cursedness and the endowment eﬀect.
3.1 Trade Game
We ﬁrst present the trade game and analyze its cursed and Nash equilibria. Two agents
(traders) {1, 2} participate in the trade game (each can be interpreted as representing a
tribe). Each trader owns a diﬀerent kind of an indivisible good. Each trader i ∈ {1, 2}
9 This intuition is formalized brieﬂy only in an unpublished early version of the paper, Heifetz and Spiegel
(2001), Section 3.1.
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observes a private signal xi regarding the unobserved qualities of his own good, where x1, x2
are independent uniform10 random variables over [L,H] where 0 < L < H. We assume for
simplicity that xi is the value that trader i attaches to his own good. Let µ ≡ E (xi) be the
expected value of xi and µ≤y ≡ E (xi|xi ≤ y) be the expected value of xi, conditional that his
value is at most y. In addition, both traders receive a public signal α > 1, which is a surplus
coeﬃcient for trade: the good of agent −i is worth αx−i to agent i.11 High α represents
better general conditions for trade, disregarding the speciﬁc qualities of the objects that each
trader owns. For example, if both parties have a great need for the commodity they do
not own, then α will be high. Given that α captures the conditions for trade aside from
ﬂuctuations in product quality, which are captured by x1 and x2, we assume that α, x1, and






The agents interact by simultaneously declaring whether they are willing or not willing to
trade. The goods are exchanged if and only if both agents agree to trade.
A pure strategy of a player is a measurable set of signals A ⊆ [L,H] (the acceptance set)
for which the agent accepts trade. A threshold strategy x ∈ [L,H] means that the acceptance
set is [L, x]. For each q ∈ [0, 1] let q be the mixed type-independent strategy by which a
player agrees to trade with probability q, regardless of his signal. A fully cursed player,
as deﬁned in Eyster and Rabin (2005), believes that his opponent uses a type-independent
strategy. That is, if his opponent plays A, he plays a best response against the strategy
q(A) = Pr (A) = |A|
H−L . A strategy is fully cursed-dominant if it is a best response against all
type-independent strategies.
The following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium in fully cursed-dominant
strategies of the trade game.
Proposition 1. The game admits the following unique fully cursed-dominant strategy: trader
i accepts trade if and only if xi < αµ.
Proof. Each cursed agent mistakenly believes that the other trader uses a type-independent
strategy. Thus, each agent i evaluates the other good at its ex-ante value αµ (without
conditioning on the other agent's agreement to trade) and accepts trade if his own good is
worth less: xi < αµ. This strategy is fully cursed-dominant for every type of agent i (and
10See Section 5.1.1 for a discussion on the uniformity assumption.
11Our results remain qualitatively unchanged in the case where each agent i privately obtains an indepen-
dent identically distributed surplus coeﬃcient αi.
12The conditions imposed on α are only to make the presentation of the results simpler. Full support over
(1, Hµ ) is needed for uniqueness. The results are identical in the case where we allow for smaller or higher α's
(while the notation becomes cumbersome).
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strictly fully cursed-dominant if the other player agrees to trade with positive probability).
Remark 1. Observe that each cursed trader makes a systematic mistake: he accepts trade
even for values that are too high, that is, that generate an expected negative payoﬀ from
trade. This is because each trader does not take into account the fact that the expected value
of his partner's object conditional on trade is lower than the unconditional one, as types of
his partner with high signals do not trade.
We next study the equilibrium when the traders are not cursed. The game admits a
Nash equilibrium where both traders never trade. The following proposition characterizes
the unique Nash equilibrium of the interaction that also has positive trade probability.
Proposition 2. For each 1 < α < H/µ the game admits the following symmetric Nash
equilibrium: each trader i agrees to trade if and only if xi < x
∗ (α) where x∗ (α) is the unique
solution to the following equation:
x∗ (α) = αµ≤x∗(α). (1)
Moreover, this equilibrium has the following properties:
1. It is unique equilibrium with positive trade probability.
2. It Pareto-dominates (for all traders' types) the no-trade Nash equilibrium.
The proof is presented in the appendix. In a Nash equilibrium, traders' expected gain
from trade depends on the beliefs they form about the strategy of their partner. Each agent
i, with a rational (self-fulﬁlling) belief, evaluates the other good at a value of αµ≤x. Thus,
eq. 1 describes an agent's indiﬀerence condition in a symmetric solution.
3.2 Perception Game
In this subsection we present an auxiliary two-stage game in which principals choose a per-
ception bias for agents that will trade in the second stage. Then we interpret the perception
biases as genetic types and the principals as natural selection, and show how the endowment
eﬀect evolves as a response to cursed behavior.
The interaction includes two stages: a perception game (stage 1) and a trading game
(stage 2). At each stage there are two players: two fully rational principals in the perception
game, and two fully cursed agents (traders) in the trading game. The trading game is the
10
same as in the basic model, except that each trader i is endowed with a perception bias 
a continuous function ψi : [L,H] → [L,H] that distorts trader i's perception of his signal.
Formally, trader i with signal xi misbelieves his signal to be ψi (xi). Each principal in the
ﬁrst stage is associated with one of the traders in the second stage, and he beneﬁts from
this trader's second-stage payoﬀ. At the ﬁrst stage (the perception game), the principals
simultaneously choose a perception bias for their agents. Each principal i is allowed to
choose a mixed strategy  a distribution ηi ∈ ∆ ([L,H]→ [L,H]) and a perception bias
ψi will be chosen for his agent according to ηi. At the second stage, endowed with their
perception biases, the traders play the unique fully cursed-dominant strategy (notice that
strategy is independent of the perception bias of the partner).
Note that, in the trade game taking place in the second stage, agents are biased and thus
best respond with perceived strategies. i's perceived best response is to the belief that trader
−i plays the type-independent mixed strategy Pr (ψ−1−i (A−i)). Notice that, although agent
−i believes he plays A−i, due to his perception bias he really plays ψ−1−i (A−i) and therefore
this is the strategy trader i is best-replying to. We refer throughout to the perceived strategies
and therefore omit the adjective perceived unless otherwise stated.
A pure13 perception proﬁle ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) presents the endowment eﬀect if each type of each
trader overestimates the value of his own good: ψi (xi) > xi for each xi < H, i ∈ {1, 2}. The
perception game has equilibria in which both principals induce extreme endowment eﬀect in
their agents and as a result the agents never trade. Such equilibria are counterintuitive, as
they induce low types (close to L) to reject trade (a weakly dominated strategy), while such
types can only earn from agreeing to trade. In what follows, in order to simplify the analysis
and presentation, we exclude such extreme perception biases. We allow the principals to
choose only perception biases where the lowest type L agrees to trade for every α > 1. That
is, for each player i we require that: ψi (L) ≤ µ.
The following proposition shows that the perception game has a unique dominance-
solvable Nash equilibrium that exhibits the endowment eﬀect.





13In a slight abuse of notation, we denote a pure strategy by the bias to which the mixed strategy assigns
probability one.
14We abuse notation throughout and use the same notation for both the proﬁle and the individual biases in
case of symmetric proﬁles. For example, in the context of a perception proﬁle (ψ1, ψ2) such that ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ,
we will denote both the proﬁle and the individual perception biases by ψ.
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Moreover, this equilibrium:
1. presents the endowment eﬀect;
2. is dominance-solvable: ψ∗ is the unique surviving strategy of iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies.
Proof. Observe ﬁrst that ψ∗ (x) > x for each x < H and thus ψ∗ exhibits the endowment
eﬀect. Next, observe that:
ψ∗ (x) < αµ ⇐⇒ x · µ
µ<x
< αµ ⇐⇒ x < αµ<x.
That is, the perception proﬁle ψ∗ induces the cursed traders to actually behave as if they were
fully rational agents (without biases) who play the Nash equilibrium strategy x∗ (α) of the
trade game. This implies that ψ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the perception game. We prove
dominance solvability in the appendix.
3.3 Evolutionary Dynamics
We ﬁnish this section by presenting an evolutionary interpretation of the perception game,
and show that the perception bias of all agents will converge in the long run to ψ∗ regardless
of the initial distribution.
We assume that all agents in the population are fully cursed (and this bias cannot be
inﬂuenced by the evolutionary process). In addition, each genetic type in the population
generates a perception bias in its carrier. In each generation, agents are randomly matched
and each couple plays the trading game (given their perception biases and cursedness). The
payoﬀs in the game determines their ﬁtness, i.e., the number of oﬀspring of each type in the
next generation (replicator dynamics).
In order to prove global convergence to ψ∗, we rely on Theorem 1 of Heifetz, Shannon,
and Spiegel (2007a), who prove that convergence always occurs in dominance-solvable games.
Their result can be summarized in the theorem below:
Theorem (Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a)). Consider a population that plays, in
each generation, a symmetric two-player game with a compact set of (pure) strategies for
each player. Assume that the actions of the players are determined by their types, these types
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evolve according to the replicator dynamics,15 and initially the distribution of actions has a
full support. If the game is dominance-solvable, then the population converges to a unit mass
at the unique dominance-solvable equilibrium.
Combining the result of Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a) with part two of Proposi-
tion 3 immediately yields that in the long run all agents have perception bias ψ∗ and therefore
exhibit the endowment eﬀect.
Corollary 1. Any distribution of perception biases (with full support)16 will converge in the
long run to a unit mass on ψ∗.
4 Partial Cursedness and Co-Evolution of Biases
The basic model presented above allows us to show how the endowment eﬀect and the winner's
curse fully compensate each other, and to explain why these two psychological biases may have
survived natural selection together. This model, however, has two restrictive and unnatural
properties. First, we assume that individuals are cursed and show how the endowment eﬀect
evolves. This is rather arbitrary, and we would like to have a model where both biases evolve
together. Second, in the basic model evolution leads to a homogeneous population, since
we assume that agents are fully cursed. In reality, of course, we see that individuals are
not fully cursed, and they only underestimate the informational content in others' actions.
In this section we therefore extend the basic model by allowing heterogeneity in the level of
both biases and also show how the evolutionary process can shape both the cursedness level
and the perception bias of agents.
In the rest of this section we make the appropriate deﬁnitions, analyze a generalized
version of the model presented in Section 3, and show that, in this general setup as well, the
endowment eﬀect and the winner's curse fully compensate for each other. Here is a summary
of the results and some intuition behind them. In the following subsection we show that
partially cursed traders, i.e., traders who underestimate how the behavior of others reﬂect
their private information, will choose an intermediate threshold between the two extreme
cases analyzed in Section 3. We then show that any level of cursedness can be corrected
using a speciﬁc level of endowment eﬀect: the higher the level of cursedness, the stronger
the endowment eﬀect needed in order to compensate. Thus, we obtain a continuum of types
15Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a) prove their result in a broader setup that allows for any regular
payoﬀ monotonic growth-rate function (where the replicator dynamics is a particular case).
16The full support assumption is required because the replicator dynamics does not include mutations
(which allow new types to emerge).
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that have an as-if rational behavior. We further propose that when principals can choose
both biases for their agents, they will choose only pairs of biases that lead to an as-if rational
behavior. The intuition is straightforward: a principal can always choose to make his trader
rational (i.e., not cursed and without endowment eﬀect). Any agent who does not behave
rationally will obtain a payoﬀ that is less than or equal to a rational agent. This makes all
pairs of biases, except for those where both biases fully compensate for each other, weakly
dominated strategies for principals. Lastly, in the evolutionary framework, our results imply
that if natural selection leads to a steady state, then in the long run the entire population
will exhibit the endowment eﬀect and the winner's curse at levels that fully compensate for
each other.
4.1 Partial Cursedness and Best Response
We begin by deﬁning partial cursedness as in Eyster and Rabin (2005). A partially cursed
agent underappreciates the relation between his opponent's strategy and type, but does not
ignore it completely More formally, agent i is χi-cursed (χi ∈ [0, 1]) if he best responds to the
belief that with probability χi his opponent uses a type-independent mixed strategy Pr (A−i)
(deﬁned in Section 3.1), and with probability 1− χi his opponent plays the type-dependent
pure strategy A−i . When χi = 1 the agent is fully cursed as in the previous section, and
when χi = 0 the agent is fully Bayesian.
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Since in our framework agents have the additional perception bias, we need to modify, as
we did in the previous section, the deﬁnition of a best reply. Consider the case where each
trader i is χi-cursed and has a perception bias ψi. Now, let trader −i play the pure strategy
A−i. In such a case, trader i's cursed-biased best response is to the belief that trader −i




with probability χi and the pure
strategy ψ−1−i (A−i) with probability 1− χi. Notice that, although agent −i believes he plays
A−i, due to his perception bias he really plays ψ−1−i (A−i) and therefore this is the strategy
trader i is best-replying to. The same holds for agent i.
4.2 Two-Stage Game with Cursed-Biased Traders
Next, we extend the perception game presented in the previous section to allow each principal
to determine the perception bias but also the cursedness level of his agent. Each principal
17We interpret this behavior in the common as-if fashion. Each agent does not properly introspect about
how his opponent uses his private information, but it seems he is playing as-if he believes his opponent is
playing a strategy which the actual opponent's strategy biased towards the type independent strategy.
14
i simultaneously chooses a pair of biases (χi, ψi) for his agent, where 0 ≤ χi ≤ 1 is the
cursedness level and ψi : [L,H] → [L,H] is the perception bias as deﬁned in Section 3. In
order to simplify the analysis and the presentation of the results we limit the space of possible
perception biases to include biases ψ that are (1) continuous and strictly increasing18 in x,
and (2) satisfy ψ (L) ≤ χiµ + (1− χi)L. The second condition implies (see Proposition 4)
that lowest type (L) always agree to trade for every α. The principals are allowed to choose
mixed strategies, i.e., a distribution ζi over the pairs (χi, ψi).
Given the mixed-strategy proﬁle ζ = (ζ1, ζ2), the traders play a ζ-trade game: both
agents learn the realization of α, each agent i is privately and randomly awarded with a pair
of biases (χi, ψi) according to ζi, and each agent i observes the true value of his good xi but
mistakenly believes it to be ψi (xi). Each trader i then plays a best reply to ζ−i. A cursed-
biased equilibrium of the ζ-trade game is thus a proﬁle in which for every private realization
of biases, each agent i plays a cursed-biased best response to ζ−i.
Remark 2. Note that each trader i does not observe the perception bias and the cursedness
level of his opponent; instead, agent i plays a best response against the aggregate behavior
that is induced by the distribution of biases ζ−i and the strategy of his opponent. In the
evolutionary setup, this assumption implies that genetic types of other agents are unobserv-
able. In the fully cursed case, the equilibrium strategy of each trader is independent of his
partner's bias, and so our result in that case holds for both observable and unobservable
biases. In the partially cursed case, a trader's equilibrium strategy depends on his partner's
bias. Assuming observability allows principals to use the perception bias as a commitment
device. Such a use would complicate the analysis, and as a result, no pure strategy proﬁle
would be stable (see a related analysis of observable and unobservable preferences in Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007).
The following proposition shows that every ζ-trade game admits a pure cursed-biased
equilibrium.
Proposition 4. A ζ-trade game admits a pure cursed-biased equilibrium. Furthermore, in
every such equilibrium and for every realization of χi, every trader i plays a threshold strategy
with a threshold strictly larger than χiµ+ (1− χi)L.
A ζ-trade game may have more than one pure strategy equilibrium. For each such game,
we arbitrarily ﬁx one of these equilibria and assume that both traders follow the ﬁxed equi-
librium (the results below hold for any equilibrium selection).
18Monotonicity is assumed so that ψ−1 is well deﬁned.
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We next prove uniqueness and characterize the unique equilibrium in a special case that
will be of importance. For each 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1 consider the speciﬁc perception bias




Notice that ψ∗χ (x) presents the endowment eﬀect for all χ, and that the endowment eﬀect
is strictly increasing in χ. The following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium




: χ ∈ [0, 1]}. In other
words, if principals choose a cursedness level of χ for their agents they must also give them a
perception bias ψ∗χ (x). This shows that in such equilibrium all agents behave as if they were
fully rational (that is, without any biases).
Proposition 5. Assume that the support of each ζi is a subset of Γ. Then, the ζ-trade game
admits a unique, pure, cursed-biased equilibrium in which both traders behave as if they were
rational traders who play the Nash equilibrium of the trade game. That is, they trade if and
only if x < x∗ (α), as deﬁned in Proposition 2.
4.3 Perception Game and Evolution
As in the previous section, we here use the perception game to study the evolution of biases.
We assume that each genetic type in the population generates both a cursedness level and
a perception bias in its carrier. In each generation, agents are randomly matched and each
couple plays the trading game (given their perception biases and cursedness level, and without
observing their partner's type). The payoﬀs in the game determines their ﬁtness, i.e., the
number of oﬀspring of each type in the next generation (replicator dynamics). Stable proﬁles
in this evolutionary dynamics correspond to symmetric Nash equilibria of the perception
game (as evolution in a single population can only induce symmetric proﬁles). The following
proposition characterizes the symmetric Nash equilibria of the perception game as the set of
proﬁles with a support in Γ.
Proposition 6. A symmetric proﬁle ζ is a Nash equilibrium of the perception game if and
only if its support is a subset of Γ.
Finally, we can also write the evolutionary interpretation of the results. Assume that
each genetic type in the population determines the level of cursedness and the perception
bias if its carrier. As before, we assume that in each generation agents are randomly matched
and each couple plays the trading game (given their perception biases and cursedness). The
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payoﬀs in the game determines their ﬁtness, i.e., the number of oﬀspring of each type in the
next generation (replicator dynamics). The following corollary of Proposition 6 shows that
the population can converge in the long run only to a subset of Γ.
Corollary 2. Assume that the initial distribution of biases has full support, and that it
converges in the long run to distribution ζ. Then the support of ζ is a subset of Γ.
Observe that in each generation fully rational types get a weakly best payoﬀ, and thus
they cannot be eliminated and must be in the support of ζ. For ζ to be a stable proﬁle, all
types in its support must have the same payoﬀ. This implies (similar to the proof of the
previous proposition) that all types in the support of ζ must play as if they were rational
traders, and that the support of ζ is a subset of Γ.
The set Γ is a surface in the space of [0, 1] × [L,H] × [L,H]. This is demonstrated in
Figure 1 (for L = 1 and H = 2). In the long run, all the surviving types in the population will
be inside Γ, and all these types will induce the same observable behavior and have the same
payoﬀ. Thus, in our model there are no substantial evolutionary forces to distinguish between
pairs of biases in Γ, and the population is likely to be heterogeneous. This result suggests
a strong positive correlation between the level of the endowment eﬀect and the level of the
winner's curse. Some agents are fairly rational (low level of both biases), while others display
a high level of both biases. In the next section we informally discuss indirect evolutionary
forces among the diﬀerent pairs in Γ through their inﬂuence in other interactions.
5 Discussion
5.1 Robustness
Our model includes various simplifying assumptions. In what follows, we discuss a few ways
to relax or change these assumptions, and their inﬂuence on our results.
5.1.1 Non-Uniform Signal Distributions
The only time we make use of the the uniform distribution assumption for private signals is
in the uniqueness part of Proposition 4. Uniqueness holds due to the concavity of ψ∗, and
implicitly due to the concavity of x
µ<x
. The latter property is suﬃcient to obtain the results.
A distribution that does not satisfy this condition may induce many Nash equilibria in
the trade game, even in the basic model. In any such equilibrium, rational traders use strictly
lower thresholds than cursed traders. This multiplicity of equilibria in the trade game results
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Figure 1: An example of Γ. The ﬁgure depicts the set of surviving types: for every level of
cursedness χ there is a perception bias function ψ∗(x). The net bias ψ∗(x) − x is plotted
as a line on the X-Z plane. As can be seen, the perception bias presents the endowment
eﬀect, and therefore all values are positive. The perception-bias function fully compensates
for the cursedness level, and therefore high cursedness (χ closer to one) is associated with a
greater endowment eﬀect (steeper slope for the function and higher values). This ﬁgure was
calculated assuming xi ∼ U[1, 2].
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in a multiplicity of Nash equilibria in the perception game. In each of these equilibria, agents
exhibit the endowment eﬀect (ψ∗ (x) > x for each x < H), but they may use diﬀerent levels
of the endowment eﬀect in diﬀerent equilibria. Perception biases that do not induce the
endowment eﬀect (ψ (x) < x for a positive-measure set of types) are strictly dominated,
and will be excluded from the population throughout the evolutionary dynamics. Thus, our
qualitative result still holds in this more general setup: evolution would induce all agents to
exhibit an endowment eﬀect. However, contrary to the case where the signals are uniformly
distributed, there is no unique prediction for the degree of the induced bias.
5.1.2 Other Trade Mechanisms
Our assumption that each trader evaluates his partner's good as α times the partner's eval-
uation may seem artiﬁcial in some trade setups. However, we checked several alternatives to
this surplus coeﬃcient α, and our results seem robust to the exact assumptions according to
which each trader evaluates his partner's good. In particular, we analyzed the case in which
each agent values his good in accordance with his private signal, but values the other's good
in accordance with the average of the other's signal and the good's expected value (reﬂecting
the fact that the trader ﬁnds his partner's signal less relevant than his own signal due, for
example, to diﬀerences in tastes). Note that in this model at the ex-ante stage, both traders
evaluate both goods the same. All of the results of our paper remain qualitatively unchanged
in this variant.
5.2 Main Prediction
The main new falsiﬁable prediction of our model is that there would be a relatively strong
positive correlation between the intensity of endowment eﬀect and the cursedness level that an
individual exhibits. We are not familiar with any existing theory that implies this correlation
or any experiment that tests for it, and indeed we plan to test it in future research.
One might argue that our model has a diﬀerent prediction: that people will have neither
of these biases. The model (Section 4) shows that all bias-pairs in Γ will have similar success
in simple bilateral trade interactions. This implies that the evolutionary choice among the
pairs in Γ will be determined by their success in other interactions, which we leave unmod-
eled. One may be tempted to think that a rational type (with no biases) will always have
an advantage over a type with both biases in other interactions, and that as a result only
rational types will survive in the population due to their advantage in non-barter interac-
tions. This conclusion ignores two important points. First, these behavioral biases may have
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additional beneﬁts. As was discussed earlier (in Section 2.2), several authors have claimed
that an observable endowment eﬀect may serve as a commitment device and induce credible
toughness in bargaining (Heifetz and Segev, 2004; Huck, Kirchsteiger, and Oechssler, 2005).
The winner's curse may also be beneﬁcial in some interactions. For example, it can reduce
the risk of creating information cascades.19 Second, there are signiﬁcant complexity costs
for developing fully rational thinking. Aumann (2008), among others, argues that natural
selection may ﬁnd it more cost-eﬀective to use simpler heuristics rather than full rationality,
which bears high cognitive costs. We thus conclude that, though our model does not address
all the implications of having these two biases, its natural prediction is that diﬀerent levels
of endowment eﬀect and winner's curse did survive natural selection together.
A Proofs
This appendix includes the proof of Proposition 2 from Section 3 and the proofs of all the
propositions of Section 4.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The expected payoﬀ of each trader i, αE (x−i|A−i) − xi, is decreasing in xi, and
therefore any equilibrium strategy is monotone: if trader i agrees to trade for signal x, he
agrees to trade for any signal xi < x. Thus, without loss of generality we assume that each
trader i uses a threshold strategy x∗i (α). Assume ﬁrst that 1 < α <
H
µ
. If there is positive
trade probability then L < x∗i (α). Observe that x
∗
i (α) < H as the type with the highest
signal can never earn from trading. This implies that each a x∗i (α)-type trader is indiﬀerent
to trading when
x∗i (α) = αµ≤x∗−i(α).
The fact that µ≤x is strictly increasing in x∗−i implies that both thresholds are equal, x
∗ (α) =
x∗i (α) = x
∗
−i (α), and this implies that
x∗ (α) = αµ≤x∗(α). (3)
19Bernardo and Welch (2001) show how an evolutionary process can induce agents to underestimate in-
formation that is revealed by the actions of others; they interpret it as overconﬁdence, but this could be
equivalently interpreted as the winner's curse.
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Let G (x, α) = x − αµ≤x. Observe that: (1) G (L, α) < 0, (2) α ≤ Hµ ⇐⇒ G (H,α) ≥ 0, (3)
∂
∂x
G(x, a) > 0 (due to our assumption that x has a uniform distribution), and (4) ∂
∂α
G(x, α) <
0. These observations imply that Equality (3) has a unique solution for each 1 ≤ α ≤ H
µ
(and
no solution for larger α's), and that this solution is strictly increasing in α. It is immediate
to see that if α ≥ H
µ
, then there is no adverse selection and all types choose to trade so
x∗ = H , and that if α ≤ 1 then all types choose not to trade. In addition, observe that
any type of any trader (except the threshold type) strictly prefers to follow this equilibrium.
This implies strictness of the equilibrium. Finally, observe that both traders earn a positive
expected payoﬀ (because α > 1), and this implies Pareto-dominance compared to not trading
at all.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3 (Part 2)
Proof. In part (2) of the proposition we have to show that ψ∗ is the unique surviving strategy
of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The ﬁrst iteration deletes all percep-
tion biases that do not result in a monotone behavior. To see this assume a perception bias
ψ (x) that leads to a non-monotone strategy A for its trader, i.e., there exist three signals
x < x′ < x′′ such that the trader agrees to trade for x and x′′ (x, x′′ ∈ A) but refuses to
trade for x′ (x′ 6∈ A). This perception bias is strictly dominated by a perception bias that
induces a threshold strategy (i.e., monotone strategy) A˜, with the same total probability of
agreeing to trade (that is, |A| = |A˜|). Therefore, we can ﬁrst eliminate all perception biases
that result in non-monotone behavior, i.e., where the induced strategy of the traders is not
a threshold strategy.
Given that only undominated perception biases are now used, we can eliminate additional
strategies using the following recursive argument. For any α it is always strictly better for
an agent to accept trade whenever x ≤ αL and reject trade whenever x ≥ αµ, regardless
of the strategy and the perception bias of his trading partner. Thus, biases that do not
satisfy these inequalities are strictly dominated strategies for the principals. Let Ψ0 be the
set of undominated biases, i.e., the set of biases that always induce the agent to accept
trade when x < L1 ≡ αL and reject trade when x > H1 ≡ αµ. Assuming that both
principals use undominated perception biases (biases in Ψ0), it is always strictly better to
accept trade if x ≤ αµ≤L1and reject trade if x ≥ αµ≤H1 . Let Ψ1 ⊆ Ψ0 be the set of
biases that always satisfy these conditions (against an opponent who uses strategies from
Ψ0). All strategies outside Ψ1 are eliminated at the second iteration. Deﬁne by induction
Ln = αµ≤Ln−1and Hn = αµ≤Hn−1 . In the n-th iteration, it is strictly better to accept trade
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if x ≤ αµ≤Ln−1 and reject trade if x ≥ αµ≤Hn−1 . Let Ψn the set of biases that always
satisfy these conditions (assuming the opponent's strategy is from Ψn−1). Observe that,
(Ln)n ((Hn)n ) is an increasing (decreasing) sequence and let L
∗ (H∗) be its limit. Both
these limits are characterized by the unique solution to the equation x∗ = αµ≤x∗ . Let Ψ∗ be
the limit of the sequence of serially undominated sets (Ψn)n. The above argument implies
that Ψ∗ = {ψ∗}.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. As in Proposition 2, we can assume without loss of generality that each trader uses
a threshold strategy; that is, trader i agrees to trade if and only if his biased signal ψi (x)
is below threshold y∗i (α, χi). If there is a positive trade probability then accepting trade
is strictly dominant for type ψi (x) = L and strictly dominated for type ψi (x) = H. This
implies that for each realization (χi,ψi) of ζi, trader i is indiﬀerent to trade if and only if the
perceived value of his good y∗i = y
∗
i (α, χi) satisﬁes, for every α and χi, the equality







In particular, for χi = 0,





This implies that for every cursedness level χi,
y∗i (α, χi) = αχiµ+ (1− χi) y∗i (α) . (5)
Thus, the value perceived threshold for non-cursed traders y∗i (α) immediately determines
the perceived threshold for cursed traders y∗i (α, χi). Using (5) to modify (4) we get





and using (4) once again to revise the R.H.S of this equality gives us an implicit function of
y∗i (α):













Observe that the R.H.S is greater than L when we set y∗i (α) = L and less than H when we set
y∗i (α) = H. Continuity implies that equation(6) admits at least one solution strictly between
L and H. Any such solution induces an equilibrium strategy (for a given α) in the ζ-trade
game. Equation (5) implies that this equilibrium satisﬁes y∗i (α, χi) > αχiµ + (1− χi)L >
χiµ+ (1− χi)L.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Deﬁne a threshold strategy with a perceived threshold y∗ (α, χ) ≡ αχµ + (1− χ)αµ≤x∗(α),
where x∗ (α) is the Nash threshold of Proposition 2, that is, the unique solution to x∗ (α) =
αµ≤x∗(α). Notice that (1) y∗ (α, χ) is the (perceived) best reply of a χ-cursed trader who
faces a partner that is using the Nash threshold x∗ (α), and (2) any χ-cursed trader with
perception bias ψ∗χ who uses a threshold y
∗ (α, χ) is behaving as a fully rational trader that
uses threshold x∗(α). (1) is immediate from the deﬁnition of χ-cursed behavior. To see (2),
observe that the expected value of this trader's object conditional on trade equals



















From (1) and (2) it follows that the symmetric strategy proﬁle y∗ (α, χ) is an equilibrium for




: χ ∈ [0, 1]}.
Next, we prove that this equilibrium is unique. Note that for every χ the function ψ∗χ




is strictly convex). This means that, for a ﬁxed α, the
R.H.S. of equation (6) is a strictly convex function of y∗i (α) when the supports of both ζ
′
is
are in Γ (assuming a positive probability for χi < 1; uniqueness in the case of χi = 1 is
immediate). In addition, for the extreme value L (H) the R.H.S. is strictly greater than L
(strictly less than H). This implies that there must be a unique solution to equation (6).
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that any mixed distribution over Γ induces all agents
to play as if they were playing the Nash equilibrium of the trade game without biases. This
immediately implies that any such mixed distribution is a Nash equilibrium of the perception
game (applying the same arguments as in Proposition 3). We are left with proving that any
symmetric equilibrium ζ has a support in Γ. Observe that each principal can play a best
reply against ζ by choosing a fully rational type. Moreover, any bias that induces a trader to
use a diﬀerent threshold for some value of α would obtain a strictly smaller payoﬀ. Thus, it
must be that any bias in the support of ζ induces the trader to use the same threshold (as a
function of α) against the proﬁle ζ. This implies that each bias should induce the trader to
play as if he were fully rational when playing against another fully rational agent. That is, all
biases induce the traders to use the threshold x∗ (α). The proof of the previous proposition




satisﬁes it. Observe that any other bias (χ, ψ) where ψ 6= ψ∗χ
induces a diﬀerent threshold against x∗ for some α and this completes the proof.
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